Thus far, thirteen major national reconciliation conferences sponsored by external actors (such as the UN and regional governments) have taken place, producing neither a comprehensive peace accord nor a framework for political settlement between the proliferating clan-based armed factions. The Ethiopian-sponsored Sodere process, begun in late 1996, was interrupted in late 1997 by an Egyptian-led Arab initiative. The latter was anticipated to pave the way for a national reconciliation conference scheduled to be held in the southern town of Baydhabo in March 1998, but it was later postponed indefinitely.

Somalia’s faction leaders have a dismal track record in matters of national reconciliation. They lack national vision and seem uncommitted to a democratic resolution of the Somali crisis. Presumably motivated by their own political interests, the leaders have attempted to revive the failed centralized system of government by violent means. Somalia’s present faction leaders continue to frustrate the good will of Somalia’s international benefactors as well as the legitimate aspirations of their own war-devastated people, who are yearning for the restoration of normalcy and good governance.

Northeast Somalia and Somaliland

Two relatively stable de facto political entities in northern Somalia have emerged out of Somalia’s continuing social upheaval: the breakaway Republic of Somaliland (the former British Somaliland Protectorate), and Northeast Somalia. Somaliland declared itself independent from southern Somalia (the former Italian Trust Territory) in May 1991, while the latter formed the Puntland State in July 1998, defining itself as an autonomous political entity that will eventually join the anticipated Somali federal state.

Both entities have shown an encouraging degree of initiative with regard to reconstruction in the last eight years, without the benefit of much international assistance. Economic viability primarily depends on livestock-dominated trade with the Arabian Gulf countries via the regional ports of Berbera and Bosasso in Somaliland and Northeast Somalia respectively. Livestock exports generate the bulk of the hard currency exchanged for food imports and manufactured consumer goods in Somaliland, Northeast Somalia and the economically and culturally linked regions of eastern Ethiopia. In both entities, as in other parts of Somalia, earnings from livestock exports are supplemented by additional income from remittances and other local exports of frankincense and fish.

A limited quantity of sorghum and maize is produced in the settled farming districts of Boorama and Gabiley, in the wetter plains of the high north-west plateau (where cattle replaces camels as the primary stock), giving Somaliland a more diversified economy than Puntland. Nevertheless, the bulk of the population in Somaliland and virtually the total population of Puntland depend on imported food. Both entities manage to feed their non-food-producing local populations with food imports financed by from local exports in the post-military period.

Culturally, Woqooyi Bari Soomaalia (Northeast Somalia) is clearly defined by clan exclusiveness and the traditional territorial control of the large Majeerteen clan and allied Darood groups (Leylkase, Awrtable and others). In this sense Northeast Somalia differs from Somaliland, as it constitutes a more socially cohesive political entity. Somaliland, on the other hand, supports a population of mixed (and rival) clan origin belonging to three large clan families (Dir, Isaq and Harti/Darood). This makes Somaliland socially and politically more complex than Northeast Somalia.

Cultural and political harmony as well as the peace and stability which have prevailed in Northeast Somalia since 1991 (outside the war-ravaged border town of Galka’yo and its surroundings) have created conditions favoring the development of working institutions of government. Nevertheless, key political actors there such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Isimo (titled clan and sub-clan heads and lineage leaders) have achieved little progress in the area of political rebuilding since the ouster of the military regime. Indeed, the process of building basic institutions of governance remained frozen in a kind of permanent and uncertain transition prior to the declaration of statehood by Puntland in July 1998.

Successive attempts to install working administrations at the regional level (North Mudug, Garowe and Bari) have produced unstable and ineffective regional authorities, while the only initiative prior to the formation of Puntland to institute an overall inter-regional administration, in 1992, has faltered. In the absence of formal authority in Northeast Somalia, the SSDF nevertheless informally administered the Bosasso port, and in conjunction with the Isimo preserved law and order and governed matters of common interest.

Established in the 1970s, the Majeerteen-based SSDF virtually ceased to exist as a political and military body years before Siad Barre’s despotic military regime was ousted in January 1991. The need for a political and military umbrella organization to direct the immediate collective defence of Galka’yo and its surrounding areas against the United Somali Congress (USC) of the neighboring rival Hawiya clan made the revival of the SSDF a matter of urgency after 1991. As a matter of fact, the SSDF is credited with having successfully repelled attempts made by the USC, between 1991 and 1993, to take over the contested border areas in Mudug. Nevertheless, people in the Northeast felt frustrated by the otherwise poor record of the organization in developing centralized authority; this, it was felt, was required to consolidate a fragile peace underpinned by traditional authority and also to facilitate overall socio-economic development in this previously neglected part of Somalia.

Prolonged competition for the chairmanship of the SSDF by two prominent Majeerteen political leaders, Col. Abdillahi Yuusuf (ex-military officer and now the first president of Puntland State) and his arch-rival Gen. Mohamed Abshir Musa (ex-police commissioner and now vigorously opposed to Yuusuf) has paralyzed the SSDF since 1994. In contrast with the violent power struggle between civilian and military leaders within the SNM in the post-military regime in Somaliland, the dispute between the official corps within the SSDF did not escalate beyond minor skirmishes between the two splinter factions supporting the contending leaders. This has, nonetheless, critically undermined the ability of the SSDF to dispense effective political leadership and enhance the process of reconstruction that has been taking place in Northeast Somalia in the transition period.

Since 1991, parallel efforts seeking to establish effective centralized authority in the de facto entities of Somaliland and Northeast Somalia have attained varying degrees of progress, but are still far from being successfully accomplished. This indicates the scope of political disintegration of traditional kinship-based Somali society and the decomposition of centralized public institutions of governance-the legacy of three decades of modernization and state building by independent Somali governments. The relatively more constructive experience of Somaliland in governance in the post-military period and its multi-ethnic composition makes it an interesting case to watch in the process of rebuilding wider political structures from a patchwork of clan-fiefdoms.

Somaliland is a product of colonial history, namely the 19th-century partitioning of the Somali nation into five territories: British Somaliland Protectorate (now Somaliland), Italian Trust Territory (southern Somalia, including Northeast Somalia) Northern Frontier District (north-east Kenya), the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia, and Afar and Issa Territory (now Republic of Djibouti). Unlike other entities emerging in Somalia, Somaliland represents a political unit whose borders coincide with those of the colonial administration.

Independence forms a unifying force and central political platform in Somaliland, while in Northeast Somalia/Puntland self-rule is considered an interim arrangement and a springboard to a future federal system of government for a united Somalia. To justify secession, Somalilanders tend to regard independence as an act revoking their union with southern Somalia at independence in 1960, an arrangement they believe economically and politically marginalised them. To distance itself from the turmoil that is still plaguing parts of southern Somalia, Somaliland has, since the 1993 election of President ‘Egaal, embarked on a relatively successful political rebuilding effort.

Since it declared independence, Somaliland has had two administrations headed by civilian presidents. The first president, Abdiraxmaan Ali (‘Tuur’), then-chairman of the Isaq-based Somali National Movement (SNM) and an experienced former diplomat, ran the first two-year interim SNM administration from 1991 to 1993. This was followed by three successive administrations presided over by the current civilian president, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim ‘Egaal, who was prime minister in the last civilian government (ousted by the military regime in 1969).

Somaliland adopted a system of governance that is anchored to the pervasive clan-based political culture of the predominantly nomadic northern Somali society. In this system, national conferences attended by representatives of local clans, shir beeleed, played a central role in political decision-making and in peacemaking. This inclusive and participatory approach to peace and governance allowed for the development of broad-based administrations in Somaliland. Participation of non-Isaq clans in these representative political forums, in which successive administrations were installed, had the affect of dispelling (only partially in some areas) the endemic fear of reprisals by the dominant Isaqs against those associated with the fallen regime.

Three grand congresses (singular shir beeleed, plural shir beeleedyo) have taken place in Somaliland since independence in 1991. The first congress in Bur’ao in April and May 1991 declared independence and installed the first SNM administration presided over by ‘Tuur’. The second and more broadly based shir beeleed in Boorama, from January to May 1993, elected President Mohamed Ibrahim ‘Egaal to replace Tuur as the president of the second interim administration. ‘Egaal’s first term in office expired in 1995 in the middle of the second round of fighting (1994-1996), and therefore was extended by the parliamentary Council of Elders to forestall a political void. The third shir beeleed in Hargeysa, from October 1996 to February 1997, re-elected President ‘Egaal to a five-year term in office and endorsed an interim constitution that will hopefully lay the groundwork for a system of parliamentary democracy and free and fair elections.

Paralyzed by the scarcity of material and financial resources, the first two years under Tuur’s administration were wasted. ‘Egaal’s administrations have achieved modest progress in terms of keeping a fragile peace and expanding centralized authority and functioning institutions of government in the central and western parts of Somaliland controlled by the government.

In the prolonged transitional period (1991-1997), there evolved in Somaliland a culture of locally based reconciliation processes. The Somaliland guurti (supreme council of lineage leaders) played a critical role in securing internal stability and in the development of institutions of governance. A series of peace conferences spontaneously organized by the Somaliland guurti over a period of two years successfully resolved the first round of fighting in Somaliland (1991-1992) and led to the all-clan conference in Boorama.

Propelled to the centre of the political stage by the decomposition of centralized rule and the inability of the current political elite to resurrect modern administration, traditional leaders in both Somaliland and Northeast Somalia emerged as paramount political actors in the post-military period. In Somaliland, the guurti have been politicized since 1993 when they were institutionalized as one of the two chambers of parliament in the new administration formed in Boorama. The Interim Charter for Puntland, however, failed to legislate a similar status for the Isimo who themselves have played a similar role in Northeast Somalia, securing internal stability and driving the grassroots political process that culminated in the Garowe conference.

Political developments that have unfolded in the two relatively peaceful entities in northern Somalia in the last eight years provide a case study on civil-military relations following the collapse of a military regime. Of these two evolving entities, Somaliland has achieved better results in resurrecting centralized authority and developing working institutions of government. This was realized at the cost of two rounds of fighting (1991-1992; 1994-1996) involving a power struggle between the political elite of the Isaq clans. Although the actual causes of Somaliland’s civil strife were diverse, ranging from intra-clan animosity to competition between rival clans for access to scarce resources (including control of Somaliland’s fledgling administration), the SNM factor-along with historical rivalries between its civilian and military leaders-remains an important element. Thus, Somaliland’s civil strife in the post-military period could be considered an intensification of the old power struggle within the SNM that had been suppressed for a decade in order to maintain a united front against a common foe, namely Siad Barre’s formidable army.

In Somaliland, the balance of power seems to be shifting toward civilian politicians, a change that reflects widespread public desire for a return to democratic civilian rule. The first president and his successor are both civilian politicians elected in a shir beeleed by representatives of local clans. Both civilian presidents, nevertheless, fought a violent opposition involving old divisions within the SNM between civilian and military leaders, in which the contending parties unscrupulously manipulated competing interests of the traditionally rival clans.

While Somaliland’s experience in peacekeeping and governance had been relatively violent (yet constructive), Northeast Somalia has witnessed domestic stability at the cost of political stagnation. Internal power struggles within the SSDF have often been between prominent leaders in the official corps, who dominated the administration of this relatively militaristic organization in the period of armed insurrection and after the ouster of the military regime. Unlike in the SNM, competition for control of the organization and local administration did not degenerate into internal conflict but it did split the organization into two rival factions, which had the effect of paralyzing political reconstruction in Northeast Somalia.

The first shir beeleed concluded in Garowe on August 1, 1998 installed Col. Abdillahi Yuusuf as the president of the new government for the Puntland State, dissolved political parties including the SSDF, and formulated an Interim Charter that seeks a peaceful transition to a democratic system of rule. Whether this legal framework and the good will of the current administration will be sufficient to deliver peaceful transition in the Northeast (now Puntland) is too early to contemplate. A peaceful and constitutional transition to democracy will certainly save Northeast Somalia/ Puntland from the devastating internal power struggle witnessed in Somaliland in the transitional period.

PART TWO

CIVIL AND MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE POST COLONIAL PERIOD

Civilian Rule, 1960-1969

From independence in 1960 until the military coup of 1969, Somalia had an elected parliamentary system of government composed of three branches: the legislative, the executive and an independent judiciary. In the euphoric first years of independence, political parties, however clan-based, were allowed to compete with the dominant governing parties, the Somali Youth League (SYL) in the south and Somali National League (SNL) in the north, in free and fair elections. The vibrant democracy practiced in those flourishing and formative years, along with the distinguishing economic and cultural homogeneity of Somali society, impressed critical observers enough to that they described the Somali Republic as a "model democracy in Africa."

After the first few constructive years, Africa’s presumed "model of parliamentary democracy" ran out of steam and mutated into a predatory state governed by corrupt civilian officials blatantly abusing their power for personal and political gain. The proliferation of political parties over the years signaled a general disintegration of civilian institutions of government in the Somali Republic. In the second election of 1964, the number of political parties increased to twenty-four, fielding a total of 793 candidates for the 123 parliamentary seats. During the last election in 1969, the number of parties dramatically multiplied to sixty-two with 1,002 candidates in the running. This created a volatile social situation, particularly during election campaign when numerous parliamentary candidates from different sections of the local clans had to compete fiercely (and often at a considerable financial price) for votes from their clansmen.

Poor economic performance and the misappropriation of public funds by civilian officials increased government dependence on foreign aid. The failure of the civilian government to deliver economic development and social services to the electorate created public disillusionment. In spite of deteriorating social and economic conditions, however, relations between the civilian government and the armed forces remained stable during this period, since corruption and misrule did not spill over into the military establishment. The different branches of the security forces were not politicized and were left to practice their specialized functions. The independence and professionalism of the armed forces and the capacity of the police and intelligence branches to preserve internal security explain the absence of politically motivated violence involving regular forces of the state during this period.

The admirable qualities associated with the Somali security establishment and military elite distinguished them from the venal civilian institutions of the government; as a result, members of the defence establishment came to be viewed as national heroes epitomizing the legitimate aspirations of the nation. (Successive Somali governments, including the civilian rulers, sought to develop a strong army in order to eventually achieve the national goal of regaining the missing parts of the ‘greater Somalia.’ This external orientation of the armed forces elevated them above the discredited public institutions and corrupt civilian politicians.)

The security forces dutifully stayed out of divisive clan-based politics often manipulated by opportunistic civilian politicians aspiring for high office, and exercised legitimate law-and-order functions relatively independently and within the bounds of the constitution. Their independence seems to have helped stabilize civil-military relations during this period of civilian rule, as evidenced by the remarkable absence of state-orchestrated mass oppression involving regular soldiers and policemen of the state. Moreover, there were few inducements for military officials of the new state to develop interests outside their field, for example in the political domain. This may have reduced the risk of the national forces being used in internal politics by unscrupulous politicians aspiring for public office.

As already mentioned, an important characteristic of the security forces (the army in particular) in the period of civilian rule and in subsequent governments was their external orientation, manifest in their sense of mission to protect Somali minorities in adjoining countries of the Horn. However, this tendency to vitiate colonial boundaries strained relations with neighboring states, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya. It led to the first war with Ethiopia in 1964, which mainly involved clashes between the armed forces of the warring countries, although it devastated civilian populations living in strategic border areas.

In the civilian period, the military elite dutifully kept away from the political decision-making process and the business of public administration remained the prerogative of the elected civilian ministries and members of parliament. The supremacy of civilian leaders over military officials was enshrined in the constitution. For example, the civilian president was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and had the power to declare a state of war with the authorization of the national assembly.

Military Rule, 1969-1991

Seeing themselves as an alternate force that could salvage the Somali Republic from civilian misrule, the national army and the state police seized power in a bloodless coup in October 1969, dissolving the parliament, executive and judiciary branches of the civilian government. This was welcomed with public acclaim.

The Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), made up of twenty-four high-ranking military and police officials, was set up to assume law and policy functions. SRC members took control of key government departments such as Defence, Information and National Guidance, and Internal Affairs. A subordinate Council of Civilian Ministers, with quasi-ministerial prerogatives but not ministerial powers assisted the SRC. Members of this council were often handpicked civilian administrators, technocrats and professionals, whose skills and experience were required in running routine operations of the militarized state bureaucracy.

The command structure of the Somali army deliberately vested state power with the military (which is to say the president, Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre) as opposed to the police. Power was concentrated in the President’s Political Office and extended down to the regional and district level with a formidable array of subordinate organizations, each with its own power base ultimately connected to the president either directly or via other members of the SRC. Members of the SRC headed these far-flung and formidable ancillary organizations, including the National Security Service (NSS), the dreaded intelligence secret service.

The President’s Political Office shared with the Ministry of Information and National Guidance the important task of national ‘thought control.’ According to Lewis, these were

primarily concerned with the preventive medicine for the revolutionary health of the nation. Where they were unsuccessful, the NSS and National Security Courts stepped in. The young apparatchics of the Presidency Office, partly trained in Moscow, were specifically charged with the delicate task of expounding Marxist-Leninism in its local, Somali version. Additional intellectual support was provided here by the Somali Institute of Development Administration, the political studies nucleus of the National University.

Somalia’s eight provinces were reconstituted and by the end of Siad Barre’s rule had multiplied to 18 regions. Similarly, districts also multiplied in number. Power concentrated at the centre of the political stage in the presidency also extended to the grassroots. Each region had its Regional Revolutionary Council, presided over by the military governor acting as ‘chairman’ and assisted by the local military and police commanders, the regional NSS chief, and the representative of the President’s Political Office whose main task was to ensure that local Orientation Centres (propaganda venues) were effectively functioning and properly attended. This regional pattern was reproduced on a smaller scale at the district level.

Structures formed at the local level, such as locally recruited vigilantes, workers’ committees, local dignitaries, and women’s representatives, further reinforced the strong link between the official military machinery of the central government and communities. The extent of social engineering sought by the military rulers was evident in their attempt to change even the traditional role of the clan heads-an important element of the junta’s struggle against the stated triple threat to Somali society of "tribalism, ignorance and hunger." These traditional offices were officially abolished, given a new function defined as ‘peace-seekers’, and officially became government employees who could theoretically be transferred to any clan territory in the country.

Along with its grandiose scheme to control the thinking of traditional Somali society and change its enduring kinship-based social structure, the military regime tried to establish a centrally managed national economy. Bananas, the principal export product, were marketed and exported solely by a government agency. Hides and skins from the pastoral sector were dealt with similarly. Grain produced by small-scale producers was bought by a government agency, the Agricultural Development Corporation, and sold at regulated prices through retailers or distributed directly through orientation centres.

As Lewis rightly observes, private interest and enterprises survived alongside the command economy of nationalized industries, banking, pharmacies, etc. This belied the official fiction of collectivization and state control of the economy. Traditional animal husbandry retained its individual character with private ownership of livestock, while the survival of small-scale farming and the tolerance of various privately owned large-scale banana estates clearly illustrate the mixed character of the national economy.

The military regime accomplished some positive things in the formative years preceding the Somali-Ethiopian war of 1977-78. The regime introduced Roman script for the Somali language, an accomplishment the relatively weak civilian administrations had been unable to achieve. The issue had required decisive influence as diverse interest groups supported different scripts (such as Latin and Arabic) and could not form a consensus on local scripts. The military regime is also given credit for the remarkable way it managed its relatively successful literacy campaigns, as well as its response to the 1974-75 drought.

The military elite created a well-equipped professional army and police force and an array of ancillary security forces to ensure their political survival and facilitate their socialist policies. Lewis assesses the level of military force at its zenith in the following terms:

Somalia was reputed to possess the finest military force in sub-Saharan Africa, fifth in manpower after Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zaire, and Uganda, but with much superior equipment including over 200 tanks, 300 armed cars and personnel carriers, 200 heavy guns and SAM missiles. The air force was reported to have 60 MiG fighters and a squadron of Ilyushin light bombers.

The police force and other security agencies of the state were also sufficiently developed to secure domestic peace and cow hapless civilians into submission. Nevertheless, the strong national army and the militarization of governance by the junta seem to have had the primary purpose of ensuring that national policies were faithfully followed.

To divert public attention from the misrule that crept into the militarized public administration, Siad Barre and his military colleagues in 1977 launched operations against Ethiopia over the control of the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. The timing was even more propitious as Ethiopia was heavily engaged in a war with Eritrean liberation forces. The Somali campaign against its western neighbor is generally thought to have marked the end of an initial period of construction and development and the beginning of political disintegration and economic decline.

The defeat and humiliation of the ruling military elite deepened the economic, social and political disintegration of Somali society. Nonetheless, Siad Barre and his military clique refused to peacefully relinquish power or to adopt a process of democratization. In response to declining internal legitimacy, Siad Barre’s defeated forces turned their guns inward and the different branches of the national forces were gradually deployed against the people to ensure the regime’s political survival. In the process, the distinct roles of the armed forces and security branches of the state became blurred.

Somalia’s social strife caused tremendous social, economic and political upheaval that will take a long time to reverse. Beyond the high number of combat casualties and civilian deaths, the civil war sparked an exodus of Somali refugees to Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and other countries in the Horn region. Somali refugees fleeing the fighting crossed the border into Ethiopia, along with Ethiopian refugees sheltered in refugee camps in Somalia who had to return to their country after more than a decade. The civil war destroyed public institutions of government, the economic infrastructure and rudimentary industry, and accentuated environmental degradation.

Direr still, Siad Barre’s militarized socialist state ruthlessly suppressed the evolution of democratic institutions and culture for a period of two decades. The final disintegration of the national forces and the governing military elite in January 1991 left an enduring political void and leadership crisis. The clan-based guerrilla organizations replacing the system of socialist military government were unable to establish centralized authority and resurrect the Somali state, thereby precipitating the country’s dismemberment into clan fiefdoms controlled by rival armed factions.

The military elite governed the Democratic Republic of Somalia more than a decade longer than the preceding civilian leaders, and therefore produced more military officials than civilians to aspire to public office in Somalia’s post-military period. This left a legacy of entrenched militarization of political leadership that will take some time to reverse. As indicated by the following two sections on the guerrilla and political organizations in Somalia’s emerging entities (the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in Northeast Somalia and the Somali National Movement in Somaliland), domestic peace and the return to a democratic system of governance are still very much influenced by the military elite.

PART THREE

POLITICAL ACTORS IN NORTHEAST SOMALIA AND SOMALIAND

The SSDF and the Isimo

Unlike the often-rival factions competing for legitimacy and control of the unstable political entities in the southern parts of the country, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front has managed to maintain its status as the only major political and military faction representing Northeast Somalia. Formed in the 1970s in response to state oppression of Majeerteen clansmen and allied Darood groups living in Northeast Somalia, the SSDF achieved some limited military success in the early 1980s. But internal discord and external influences gradually weakened the organization and it had almost ceased to exist as an effective political and military body by the time Siad Barre’s regime was ousted in 1991. As mentioned in the introduction, the need for responsible political leadership in the post-conflict period coupled with an external threat from the United Somali Congress/Hawiya (USC) made its return a matter of urgency.

In spite of the legitimacy and support the SSDF and its counterparts obtained from their links with the Majeerteen clan and related Darood groups, the SSDF also had gained credibility in the post-conflict era through the role it has played in various aspects of life in the Northeast:

As the only modern political organization in Northeast Somalia, the SSDF was widely thought to be primarily responsible for the establishment of a functioning administration; it was, however, ill equipped to deliver the results anticipated. The failure of the Northeast to create working institutions of governance capable of consolidating the prevailing relative peace and facilitating socio-economic progress nevertheless tarnished the image of the SSDF.

The prolonged competition over control of the SSDF between two prominent political personalities, Col. Abdillahi Yuusuf and Gen. Mohamed Abshir Muse, has impeded institutional development and organizational reform. The SSDF made use of the presence of a majority of its leadership at the Sodere conference in 1996 to organize a side conference seeking a resolution of differences between key political figures and organizational unity. One of the two contending leaders was appointed to the newly established executive committee of the National Salvation Council, leaving the contested chairmanship of the SSDF to the other. For a brief period from January 1997, the SSDF leadership (and particularly Yuusuf and Muse) showed signs of better coordination and greater unity of purpose. However, during the National Reconciliation Conference in Cairo in December 1997, differences between the two leaders ended the uneasy truce.

Despite their differences, both leaders have in the past invested greater energy in the quest for national reconciliation than in the development of effective leadership for the Northeast-a preference that has begun to occasion criticism from within their own constituencies. During the Northeast Preparatory Community Consultation Conference, held in Garowe in March 1998, the majority of the leadership of the SSDF expressed a new commitment to building basic institutions of governance in Northeast Somalia, in contrast with their earlier tendency to seek a rather illusive process of national reconciliation.

Other common criticisms of the SSDF include the following:

Since its reunification in January 1997, the SSDF has taken steps to improve its leadership. However, the organization still seems to be lacking the capacity to function as an effective political organization. In practice, the SSDF works as an informal group that responds to matters of common concern, in collaboration with lineage leaders (Isimo) and the consent of other prominent elders.

The reunited and strengthened SSDF has however taken one important, decisive step. In January 1997 it articulated clearly that it favored a federal system of government for Somalia. Accordingly, the SSDF pledged that it would work toward the formation of a state in Northeast Somalia as soon as possible. After the expected internal wrangling and the usual foot-dragging by some members, it then issued a follow-up policy decision confirming the holding of an all-inclusive, participatory community conference to deliberate on the governance issue.

In the absence of functional political leadership, titled lineage leaders (Isimo) and prominent elders have been pushed onto the political stage to fill the gap. As in the past, they administer internal matters and regulate inter-clan relations using customary law, xeer. This traditional system of rule has played, and will continue to play, a critical role in maintaining the relative stability and security enjoyed by both urban and rural society in Northeast Somalia. The SSDF and lineage leaders quite often cooperate in matters of common interest to the regions of Northeast Somalia such as defence and law enforcement. Since the traditional polity has proven more resilient than modern governance systems in Somalia, traditional leaders have a role to play in keeping domestic peace and effecting the transition to modern government.

However, the traditional system of rule must not be considered a panacea for governance problems in Northeast Somalia and Somaliland. Traditional leaders are not homogenous and adopt different attitudes toward their new role. Traditional leadership is weak and has been under considerable stress over the past decades. The most important changes include the following:

There is widespread public recognition of the Isimo as the highest moral authority in Northeast Somalia, which suggests that any future arrangements will have to accommodate them if their energy is to be harnessed in peacekeeping, governance and reconstruction work. Nevertheless, their direct involvement in real political issues, including the process of building local authority and institutions of governance, has become controversial.

Many of the lineage leaders have become urbanized and are affected by the political environment of the commercial and administrative centres of Northeast Somalia. Opinion is divided over the role they should have in politics:

Many political elites, including members of the SSDF, quietly disapprove of the increasing involvement of traditional leaders in political affairs. They consider governance and political affairs as their prerogative and the elders’ involvement as a transgression. Although a number of traditional leaders concur and are careful to confine themselves to their customary roles, others appear to cherish their enhanced public stature and are unlikely to relinquish it easily. Discreet competition for leadership and control between these two paramount local actors however does not usually deter them from cooperating in matters that are of common concern to the population. Modernists and traditional leaders depend on the local population for support and therefore have to show loyalty to the collective interest.

The political rebuilding and democratization of Somalia’s emerging political entities presents formidable problems that need collective understanding and the concerted action of local actors, most importantly the educated elite and traditional leaders. Until such time as stable and functioning institutions of modern government are firmly established, traditional authority will be required in the task of preserving law and order and in the evolution of democratic process in Northeast Somalia and Somaliland.

The public’s disappointment with the performance of the political elite, and its desire for a system that could ensure law and order, gradually empowered the faction of Al-Ittihad in Northeast Somalia and in other parts of the country. But the violent suppression of the abortive Al-Itixaad coup in the Northeast in 1992 ended the threat of militant Islam taking control of Northeast Somalia. In Northeast Somalia and Somaliland, domestic stability and the administration of public affairs are the product of weak administrations and relatively effective traditional authority. This limited the opportunities for Al-Itixaad to establish themselves, unlike in insecure areas where Islamic rule is welcomed by the public to secure internal stability.

In Northeast Somalia, power struggles and competition for leadership of the SSDF between top leaders in the official corps did not degenerate to internal conflict, but rather stalled political development and the construction of basic institutions of government despite the existence of factors favorable to self-rule. The SSDF received substantial military and financial assistance from foreign patrons (especially Libya and Ethiopia) during the civil war, and throughout its history has been dominated by security officials. In contrast, the SNM relied largely on the efforts of Isaq clansmen during the civil war, and its administration precipitated prolonged and still unresolved power struggles between the military and civilian leaders of the organization (see next section).

As in the remaining parts of Somalia, Northeast Somalia produced a large number of military and civilian elites with a vested interest in the emerging administration. However, a protracted power struggle within the military elite for the leadership of the SSDF stymied political development and presumably delayed competition between military and civilian leaders for control of the administration in the future. The development of Puntland administration provides the first important opportunity for patterns of political leadership to take shape in Northeast Somalia.

Puntland State and its Implications for Northeast Somalia

The SSDF’s latest political initiatives culminated in the Garowe shir beeleed of April 15 to July 1, 1998. Attended by more than 400 delegates representing local clans and sub-clans living in Northeast Somalia and in Harti-controlled territories in Somaliland (Eastern Sanaag and Laasaanood region) this first constitutional congress resolved some critical issues. First, it established Puntland State, with a structure of government formed of three branches: legislative (69 members), executive (nine ministries) and an independent judiciary. Second, Col. Abdillahi Yuusuf was elected the first president of Puntland Federal State and given the difficult task of building a viable administration from scratch as well as laying the groundwork for free and fair elections. Third, an Interim Charter defining the functions of the different branches of the Puntland administration was formulated. Fourth, political parties, including the SSDF, were banned in the interim three-year period in order to discourage internal dissent and deny opponents political leverage and a power base from which to subvert the new administration.

While the Garowe congress has instituted the first inclusive administration for Northeast Somalia/Puntland, it has not entirely resolved the leadership crisis. Chief contenders for the presidency of Puntland, Gen. Abshir (from Garowe region) and his ally Abdullahi Boqor Musa (a civilian and former lawyer from Bari region) rejected the verdict of the grand shir beeleed and vehemently declared their joint opposition to the new administration.

The newly formed Puntland entity extends beyond the territorial and administrative boundaries of Northeast Somalia and it encompasses the Harti land in northern Somalia, including traditional territories controlled by Harti clans living in Somaliland. The extension of Puntland territory into the Eastern Sanaag and Laascaanod regions of Somaliland is opposed by the administration in Somaliland and its supporters. The political alignment and administrative status of the Harti in Somaliland raises a wider issue that has not yet been addressed by the parties concerned: whether emerging political entities in Somalia should be based on blood (kinship ties) as Northeasterners would like, or on historical facts and common economic interest as Somalilanders would prefer. Until this issue is peacefully resolved by all the parties concerned (Somaliland, Puntland and the Harti living in Somaliland) it will remain a potential threat to the security and stability of Somalia’s relatively stable entities of Northeast Somalia and Somaliland.

The security program of the Puntland administration is presented in an overall program document for the interim period, 1998-2001. The relevant section states:

Therefore, in cognisance of the peaceful environment prevailing in the region, the Government of Puntland State shall focus and give first priority to Security, and shall immediately consolidate law and order in its domain of administration, by re-establishing legal enforcement organs such as the police force, courts and prisons. To fulfil these objectives the government shall carry out the following steps:

1. The Government shall immediately create a strong Police Force, which can enforce norms and can safeguard the security of Puntland State. This police force shall consist of two major segments:

Local Police: The local police is the peacemaking force which is largely concerned with restoring law and order in urban settings.

Border Police: Darawish police force with the function to protect and safeguard the general security of Puntland State, including the rural areas and border lines.

The police force in general shall be selected from the former trained national police force, trained militia or suitable and capable citizens.

2. Disarmament and demobilisation of militia and the general masses by designing specific projects and programmes related to re-socialisation, retraining, and job creating as an effort to overcome the disastrous effects of the civil war. In general, since peace and security are prerequisite to viable socio-economic development Puntland State shall focus and put all possible emphasis on the issue of security.

3. The Government shall establish communication networks for demobilisation and reorientation of the masses particularly the youngsters such as radio programmes, articles on the journals and sessions of discussions.

4. The Government shall plan programmes for de-mining which have been planted during the civil war in Mudug, Sool and Sanaag regions and Buuhootle district areas.

The security program of the Puntland administration greatly differs from those of past governments, as it intends to form a police rather than a military state. This will be achieved through the formation of a strong police force made up of two branches, namely local police and border police.

The local police has been mandated to preserve law and order in the towns, while the border police will deal with external aggression and ensure the territorial integrity of Puntland state. In addition, the border police have the wider function of securing domestic stability by policing rural areas frequented by the predominant nomadic section of society. This modest security policy is realistic because Puntland at present cannot afford to support both army and police forces. It is also relevant since there is no external threat to Puntland’s stability at present.

Whether this security program will be enough for Puntland to ensure internal stability is not certain, because Puntland faces many of the same circumstances that led to militarization in Somaliland: internal opposition, un-demobilized clan militia and ex-soldiers occupying revenue-generating public facilities, such as Bosasso port and airport and the highway linking Bosasso to other parts of Puntland, Somaliland and Mogadishu.

The SNM and the Guurti

The continued oppression of the Isaq population in the Northwest has led to increased support among the Isaqs living in the country and abroad (especially the London-based group and migrant workers in Saudi Arabia) for the development of an armed and organized resistance-namely, the Somali National Movement (SNM), which was founded in 1981.

Lewis defines the London group as secular and nationalist in its political outlook and the Saudi-based members as religious and quite ardent in their support of the Isaq. It seems that the religious element in the organization was most influential during the formative years, but started to wane in importance with the shift of the SNM from London to its base in eastern Ethiopia in 1983 and the subsequent intensification of its ten-year-long guerrilla war against Siad Barre’s forces. The loss of religious leaders as a contending faction within the SNM and subsequent changes, including the defection of high ranking civilian politicians to the SNM, precipitated the development of new rival power blocks within the organization between military officials and civilian leaders. The absence of institutions that could regulate access to power and authority gave the professional distinction between the military and civilian elite a political force in the rampant competition for control of the SNM. United by a sense of common purpose during the struggle, relations between the civilian and military leaders became further strained during the post-military period.

The above reconstruction of the internal politics and history of the SNM is certainly not exhaustive but it provides a glimpse of the complex internal processes that later impacted upon governance and stability in Somaliland during the post-military period. Mark Bradbury explains the complexity of SNM politics in the following terms:

Although the SNM produced a political manifesto for government, like the other movements its struggle generally lacked a unifying ideology. Capitalism, clanism, democratic socialism, Islam, and regional separation had their various adherents within the SNM. Disputes arising from these internal differences weakened the movement. Primary among these was a clash between the civilian and military wings and the ‘right’ and ‘left’ leaning tendencies in the SNM.

In November 1983, at an emergency meeting of the central committee of the SNM in Jijiga, eastern Ethiopia, the chairman of the executive committee and his religious colleagues were replaced by military officers who had defected from the Somali army. Col. ‘Abdal-Qadir Kosar became chairman, Aden Shine Mohamed became vice-chairman, and Mohamed Kahin Ahmed (later first Minister of Defence in the 1991 SNM interim administration) became secretary. Hassan ‘Ise, a veteran SNM leader, survived as the only civilian politician in the new five-man executive committee.

The new military leadership ran the organization from July 1983 to August 1984, a period marked by increased military activity against Siad Barre’s forces in Northwest Somalia. At the fourth SNM congress in August 1984, the military chairman of the SNM, ‘Abdal-Qadir Kosar (Habar Yonis), lost the chairmanship after being undermined by other politicians of his own clan (but of different lineage). This allowed A’hmed Mo’hamed Siilaanyo (a former minister in Siad Barre’s government and current Minister of Finance in Somaliland) to take over the chairmanship of the SNM. Siilaanyo was succeeded by a civilian chairman, Abira’hman Ali (Tuur), the president of the first SNM administration of Somaliland.

The military officials were naturally eager to transform the organization into a professional and efficient military and political body; but efforts to do so were frustrated by the clan character of the SNM. Lewis describes the point:

Reviewing the clan composition of successive executive committees, it is interesting to note that the order in which the three main Isaq clans were represented in the leadership changed cyclically over time. The Habar Awal who had held the top position in the second committee were now in the third post (having moved the chairmanship to the secretaryship). The Habar Yuunis who had held the second position moved to the top (from vice-chairman to the chairman), and the Habar Tol Je’lo moved from third to second in rank (from secretary to chairman).

The struggle of the SNM depended on support from different sectors of the Isaq population, including the Isaq diaspora, refugees in camps in eastern Ethiopia, and Isaq nomads. It received relatively little external military and financial assistance as both interested governments in Ethiopia and Somalia worked to subvert its objectives.

The vital dependence of the SNM on Isaq clansmen made it responsive to the wishes of the wider population, particularly the traditional leaders who administer the affairs of local clans. Along with the majority of the public, traditional leaders supported the civilian leaders in the power struggle within the SNM-an inclination that seems to have endured in the post-military period. The fact that the last two chairmen of the SNM have been politicians lends credence to the increasing influence of civilian leaders within the SNM.

In spite of its inherent institutional weaknesses, the SNM is nonetheless credited with being the most organized of the clan-based armed movements. Compared to its counterparts in southern Somalia, which were formed mainly in the last years of Siad Barre’s regime, the SNM produced a clearer political manifesto. It also published its policies, in which the clan system was posited as a central element in governance and political stability, social cohesion and economic activity. Accordingly, the SNM proposed "a new political system built upon Somali cultural values of co-operation rather than coercion; a system which elevated the Somali concept of xeer on inter-family social contract in which no man exercised political power over another except according to established law and custom, to the national level."

The SNM laid greater emphasis on the role of the elders. Their post-conflict model of governance sought an appropriate blend between a traditional system of rule enshrining democratic and egalitarian values, and principles of modern institutions of centralized government. The SNM constitution legislated a two-chamber parliament with an upper house of elders. The Council of Elders (guurti) was an integral element of the SNM’s political and military strategy. Indeed as early as February 1986, Isaq elders met to deliberate the formation of a provisional government in the north.

The Search for Viable Governance and Peace in Somaliland during the Prolonged and Violent Transition 1991-1997

The Tuur Administration, 1991-1993

Once Siad Barre’s regime had been ousted from Northwest Somalia in February 1991, the SNM immediately convened the first representative congress (shir beeleed) in Bur’ao in April and May 1991. The delegates of the major clans attending the congress, including representatives of non-Isaq clans, proclaimed the independence of Somaliland and installed a two-year interim SNM administration. The incumbent chairman of the SNM, Abdira’hman Ali (‘Tuur’), an experienced ex-diplomat, was elected as the president of an administration charged with rebuilding a war-ravaged entity from scratch and effecting a transition to a democratic system of governance. Without financial and material backing, however, Tuur’s administration encountered problems of security, specifically in managing clan-based SNM militias and others controlled by non-Isaq clans.

Before the height of the civil war in 1988, the strength of the SNM fighting force was estimated at 3,000. The escalation of the war prompted mass militarization of the SNM as Isaq clansmen were mobilized for the struggle. After liberation, many of the SNM militias spontaneously disarmed and reintegrated to civilian life. Others, however, remained as clan-based units manning checkpoints along trade routes and controlling revenue-generating public facilities in clan territories. In 1993, official figures released by the government of Somaliland estimated the number of armed militia in the country at 50,000-a highly inflated figure.

Spontaneous disarmament did not bring about an actual reduction in the number of armed militias operating in Somaliland, as new irregulars who did not fight in the war joined remnants of SNM units and non-Isaq militia clans. In addition, the presence of armed SNM militias loosely connected to clans and living off the land increased the currency of banditry and generalized lawlessness. Tuur’s administration was unable to impose law and order and the armed militias continued to pose a real threat to internal peace and domestic stability. This fluid social situation created political uncertainty and instigated a power struggle between political elites, who then manipulated rival clans vying for access to scarce resources.

Old divisions within the military and civilian wings of the SNM resurfaced more intensely in the post-military period, in the absence of a common foe. Opposition to Tuur’s administration coalesced around the ‘alan cas faction of the SNM, which accused the government of having a civilian bias and deliberately under-representing the military wing. Dominated by the military elite of the SNM (who were either dissatisfied with their status in Tuur’s administration or were aspiring for high office in a new administration), the opposition also included civilian politicians with a vested interest in ending Tuur’s administration.

The first armed revolt against Tuur’s supposedly civilian-dominated administration occurred in Bur’ao town in January 1991 and involved the armed militias of the traditionally rival Habar Yoonis (the president’s clan) and Habar Je’lo clans. They were vying for control of Bur’ao town, which is populated by both clans. Col. Mohamed Kahin (an important member of the ‘alan cas) and Suleyman Gaal (a civilian politician who served as a minister in Egaal’s administration prior to1997) are thought to have played an active role in the Habar Je’lo insurgency.

Tuur’s desperate effort to expand central authority outside Hargeysa (and to establish government control over revenue-generating public facilities) by establishing a national army from the clan-based SNM militia helped instigate inter-clan warfare. In March 1993, the administration organized a multi-clan force in order to establish control over the vital port of Berbera, which now generates more than half of the Somaliland government’s income. Government forces met stiff resistance from the local ‘Iise Musa militia of Habar Awal, which saw the government’s move as a veiled attempt by the president’s Habar Yonis clan to establish supremacy in Berbera and in Somaliland as a whole.

Sensing an imminent inter-clan war, non-Gar’hajis members of the government forces (such as Arab and Sa’ad Musa militias) withdrew, and the fight over control of Berbera degenerated to a tribal war between the Habar Yonis and ‘Iise Musa militias. Col. Dhege Weyne, a veteran SNM leader and a prominent member of ‘alan cas, led the ‘Iise Musa insurrection that foiled Tuur’s efforts to establish control over the Berbera port.

A series of reconciliation conferences organized by the guurti successfully resolved inter-clan fighting in Somaliland. This local-level peacemaking reached it climax at the congress in Sheikh in October 1993, when the embattled ‘Iise Musa and Habar Yoonis clans negotiated a peace accord. This guurti-mediated congress not only restored relations between hostile clans but also set two broad agenda items for the second grand congress of Somaliland, held in Boorama: nabadeyn (peacemaking, or restoration of peace), and aaya ka talin (literally meaning: ‘deciding the future destiny’).

The first round of fighting had the following impact:

‘Egaal’s Administration, 1993-1997

The second shir beeleed in Boorama in 1993 could be interpreted as a watershed with respect to peacemaking and political development in Somaliland. It successfully concluded Somaliland’s first cycle of inter-clan fighting and peacefully ended the discredited Tuur’s two-year term. It also installed a broad-based government presided by the second civilian president, Mohamed Haji Ibra’him ‘Egaal. Agreement had been reached on a new administrative structure made up of three branches: a two-chamber legislature (an elected parliament and a Council of Elders, or guurti), the executive council and an independent judiciary. The Interim Charter and Peace Charter were formulated as the legal framework for the new administration. The former functioned as the constitution in the interim period of 1993-1997, while the latter sealed peace accords mediated by the guurti and also outlined methods and procedures for conflict resolution-a mandate assumed by the Council of Elders.

The new administration was more broadly based and representative than the first SNM-dominated government. The first administration allocated 17 ministerial posts to Isaq clans (out of the 23), and the remainder were divided among the others. ‘Egaal’s successive administrations improved representation from non-Isaqs by increasing the number of ministerial posts for non-Isaqs, and by regularizing important portfolios to be entrusted to the other clans. In light of their status as the second-most important group in Somaliland, the Gadabursi clan was given the vice presidency while the other important post, the Speaker of the Parliament, was allocated to the Dhulbahante.

‘Egaal’s administration did better than his predecessor’s in terms of extending power and authority in Somaliland. The government established control over revenue-generating public facilities, thus creating a resource base for basic functions of the administration; in 1994, customs and excise duties from Berbera port (‘Egaal’s home town) were collected, as were taxes on khat imported from Ethiopia at the customs office in Kalabeydh--important steps in this direction. The introduction of the Somaliland shilling and the opening of the central bank bolstered the financial base of the administration. A judicial system made up of regional and district courts was established. A police force was organized, equipped and made functional in the central and western administrative towns controlled by the government.

‘Egaal’s popularly elected government was greeted with a brief period of stability that provided a window of opportunity for privately driven socio-economic reconstruction to flourish in the war-devastated administrative and commercial centres in Somaliland. This brief lull was reversed by the eruption of a second round of fighting between government forces (a coalition of non-Gar’hajis clans) and disaffected Gar’hajis militias over the control of Hargeysa airport in November 1994. The fighting spread to the second largest town, Bur’ao, in March 1995.

The second cycle of fighting dragged on much longer than the first round and devastated the cities of Hargeysa and Bur’ao. It spontaneously died down without a formal agreement between the warring parties before the third shir beeleed was held in Hargeysa between October 1996 and February 1997. The causes of the second phase of fighting are as diffuse as those suggested for the first cycle of violence, ranging from unresolved issues of power-sharing among the Isaq clans to competition over Somaliland’s resources (trade and currency), and historical animosities between Isaq clans.

Competition over control of Djibouti-Somaliland trade and the strategic village of Zeila caused fitful fighting between the Isaq, Gadaburi and ‘Iisa militia in Awdal region in 1995. Nevertheless, like the first cycle of violence, the second round of fighting was concentrated in the Isaq-controlled areas of Somaliland and appeared to be the result of a power struggle between Isaq clan-based political elites.

For their part, Gar’hajis politicians manipulated clan grievances such as under-representation in the new administration formed by ‘Egaal in the middle of 1993. The most prominent members of the Gar’hajis opposition were Tuur (the first civilian President) and Gen. Jama Mohamed Kaalib (‘Iidagale). Tuur had denounced the independence of Somaliland that had brought him to power after the Bur’ao congress of 1991. Tuur’s radical change in attitude toward Somaliland appears to have been expedited by financial inducements from UNOSOM, which desperately wanted to patch together a peace deal and create a national government before leaving its discredited mission in Somalia in March 1994. Tuur found a political ally in Gen. ‘Aidiid’s faction, with whom the SNM had forged an agreement of military cooperation during the civil war. He resurrected the chairmanship of the virtually defunct SNM and in 1995 joined ‘Aidiid’s self-proclaimed government in Mogadishu as vice president. His colleague, Jama Kaalib, joined ‘Aidiid’s ‘administration’ as foreign minister.

The externally based unionist Gar’hajis politicians, cooperating with a faction established in the south of Mogadishu, had less impact in the actual fighting as they did not secure significant assistance to influence the outcome of the war. Their presence, however, does indicate an external element in the conflict and lends support to the view that the second round of fighting in Somaliland was a proxy war.

The warring parties, the government and the Gar’hajis opposition differed in their interpretation of the nature of the second cycle of fighting in Somaliland. The opposition tried to project it as an inter-clan conflict between President ‘Egaal’s Habar Awal clan and the rival Gar’hajis. The government, on the other hand, described the conflict as politically motivated and inspired by disgruntled politicians bent on overthrowing an elected government; it therefore felt justified in invoking the right to defend Somaliland from power-seeking unionists manipulating clan grievances.

The government’s superiority in terms of armament and manpower, however, did not bring about a decisive victory over the loosely organized and poorly equipped clan militias. The war dragged on much longer than the first round of fighting, from the end of 1994 to 1996. The participation of the opposition in the third shir beeleed in Hargeysa in February 1997, at which ‘Egaal was re-elected as president for another five-year term, ended the protracted fighting without a formal agreement between the warring parties.

The Civilian vs. ‘alan cas Factor

The above reconstruction seems to suggest that the conflict might be a continuation of the internal power struggle between the political elite of the Isaq family of clans, involving old divisions within the SNM and the rivalry between the ‘alan (military elite) and the civilian wing for control of Somaliland.

Like his civilian predecessor, President ‘Egaal could not escape the destabilizing effects of the internal power struggle between political elites. His government was accused of being dominated by a ‘single political wing.’ According to Bradbury,

This referred to ‘Egal’s first choice of cabinet ministers who included some of the most aggressive opponents of Tuur’s administration and members of the ‘alan cas faction within the SNM who had opposed Tuur during the conflict in Berbera in 1992. The impression given was that those who fought against the Tuur administration won the war and so undermined the spirit of reconciliation achieved at Sheik.

Having served as prime minister is the last civilian government before the military revolt of 1969 and having suffered humiliation and imprisonment in the hands of a ruthless junta, ‘Egaal could scarcely be accused of sympathy or bias toward the military elite. Nonetheless, ‘Egaal’s detractors and the leaders of the Gar’hajis militia accused him of over-representing the ‘alan cas faction in his administration--the reverse accusation having been made against Tuur in the first SNM-dominated administration.

The first cabinet formed by ‘Egaal in 1993 certainly featured more ‘alan cas military officials than civilians politicians. That the Gar’hajis, particularly the Habar Yonis, were under-represented may also be true. However, it is simplistic to infer from these grievances a deliberate policy designed to embarrass the Gar’hajis by rewarding their political foe, the military faction that had overthrown the allegedly Gar’hajis-dominated SNM administration headed by Tuur.

The following circumstances explain the sizeable representation of the ‘alan cas leaders in the first cabinet formed by ‘Egaal in mid-1993:

President ‘Egaal’s mistrust of military leaders surfaced in 1995, once the fighting stalemated and the threat posed by the armed militias diminished. He carried out a series of cabinet shuffles in 1995 and 1996 that effectively purged ‘alan cas ministers from the cabinet and replaced them with hand-picked civilian politicians loyal to his administration. In September 1995 a prominent ‘alan cas member still in cabinet, Col. Musa Biixi, was released from the important Ministry of the Interior and replaced with a civilian politician from the same clan. ‘Egaal could not lawfully replace the remaining ‘alan cas strongman, the Gadabursi vice president ‘Abdira’hman Aw Ali, but stripped him of the defence portfolio. To add insult to injury, the president accused the military elite of belligerence and shifted the blame for the fighting to them.

Competition between the ‘alan cas and the civilian faction for administration of the SNM existed during the organization’s decade-long struggle against Siad Barre’s despotic regime (1981-1991). Suppressed during the civil war in order sustain Isaq unity against a common foe, this long-standing power struggle surfaced in the unstable independence period as competition between the rival blocks for control of the administration, without any rules or institutions other than the elastic clan factor.

As stated in the section dealing with the SNM, power seems to have shifted in favor of the civilian leaders since the height of the popular armed struggle, a shift that has endured in Somaliland in the post-military period regime. This transformation to a civilian system of rule in Somaliland was violent and has brought Somaliland two rounds of fighting. Yet it apparently reflects public preference for civilian rule and parliamentary democracy.

Conflict Resolution

The successful inter-clan reconciliation process embarked upon by the guurti in1992 saved Somaliland from chaos and proved more successful than highly publicized and expensive UN-sponsored reconciliation efforts carried out in southern parts of the country. This local-level peace process also had a constructive role for governance in Somaliland as it prepared the ground for the first shir beeleed in Boorama in 1993, in which the guurti elected ‘Egaal as the president of the broadly based new administration.

The institutionalization of the guurti as the House of Elders in the two-chamber legislature in ‘Egaal’s successive administrations rewarded their good work in Somaliland during the troubled first SNM administration. But the new status of the guurti as salaried civil servants cost them their perceived neutrality and moral authority, central elements in the traditional method of reconciliation in Somali society. With a vested interest in the survival of the government, the guurti utterly failed to settle peacefully the second cycle of fighting between their paymasters (the government) and the Gar’hajis opposition. The politicization of the guurti undermined an important local peacemaking instrument and allowed the fighting to drag on much longer than did the first cycle of fighting.

The inability of the guurti to dispense their constitutionally mandated role of peacemaking and conflict resolution, as well as the polarization of the warring parties, made inevitable the intervention of a third party. The externally based Peace Committee for Somaliland originated from a series of consultations within the Somaliland diaspora in early 1995. The peacemaking role of the Peace Committee did raise suspicions in both camps of the warring parties, which hampered its effort to mediate the government and the opposition and restore stability. Nevertheless, the grassroots work of the Committee succeeded in placing the issue of peace back on the agenda and facilitated a successful inter-clan reconciliation process in Bur’ao region. A similar process of inter-clan reconciliation sponsored by the Peace Committee in the Hargeysa area failed to materialize due to government’s predisposition to settle the dispute on its own terms.

‘Egaal’s first tenure in office expired during the fighting in 1995. His term in office was extended by 18 months by the guurti (without consensus) for fear of political disintegration. This drew criticism from the opposition, which viewed the move as unconstitutional and a violation of the National Charter.

The second cycle of fighting reversed the spontaneous return of Isaq refugees from refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia, as many of them had to flee from the affected towns of Hargeysa and Bur’ao and return to the camps. Much of the internally displaced population returned to Hargeysa after two to three months, once the government had flushed the Gar’hajs militia from their stronghold south of the river; Bur’ao remained a ghost city until the cessation of hostilities at the end of 1996. Successful reconciliation between the local clans in 1996 did facilitate the return of Habar Yonis townsmen but not those of Habar Je’lo, who are still living in large numbers in Yurowe village, which was transformed into a commercial centre by the conflict.

The war slowed recovery and revival of the vital export trade, undermined business in the east and caused hyperinflation in the west. Once more the civil strife inflicted pain on previous injuries, eroding the confidence of ordinary Isaqs in the political elite and deepening doubts held by non-Isaqs about the commitment of the Isaqs to the survival and progress of Somaliland.

Militarization

The Somaliland Peace Charter not only sealed relations between reconciled clans and charted methods of conflict resolution, it also envisaged a local security arrangement entrusting local groups to assume greater responsibility for their security. Nevertheless, the weak administration in Boorama immediately confronted the issue of security and the demobilization of clan militias, and within months ‘Egaal secured an agreement on the gathering of armed militia in cantonment sites with some armed local militias and their respective commanders and traditional leaders. Government efforts favored the institutionalization of the demobilization process and this acted as a ‘honey pot’ by attracting large numbers of clan militia with the promise of employment and training benefits.

In September 1993, 3,000 clan militia were encamped in Mandera, south of Berbera. In February 1994, the NDC (National Demobilisation Commission--a local authority) declared that it had acquired three-quarters of the weapons of five brigades, primarily in the Hargeysa area and points west. The reintegration of the militias proved to be more difficult, however, as the integrating authority, SOOYAAL (a war veterans’ association) had neither the means nor the capacity to do the work. Only several hundred of the encamped soldiers were recruited into the police and customs forces; the remainder were sent home disillusioned and unemployed. An informed estimate in early 1995 suggested that some 10,000 militia remained to be integrated.

Initial efforts by the government and local business communities (who wanted clan militias off the streets and trade routes) could not be sustained due to limited resources and experience. With the exception of some modest support from the German government through GTZ, CARE, Oxfam, and the Swiss Group, the anticipated external assistance toward the demobilization and reintegration of Somaliland’s ex-combatants from UNOSOM and the rest of the international community did not materialize.

The outbreak of war in 1994 derailed local efforts toward demobilization, politicized the issue of security and led to the reversal of a 1993 government pledge not to form an army. To the chagrin of the opposition, and at the cost of being accused of violating the Interim Charter, the government launched a relatively large-scale recruitment of clan militias into the National Army, the first brigade of which was fielded in March 1994. At the height of the fighting in September 1995, the National Army was estimated to number as many as 15,000 uniformed soldiers. The current level of the security forces are: 8,000 police force; 1,500, custodial corps and 15,780 soldiers. This indicates that the size of the army has increased slightly since 1995, due to the recruitment of opposition militias into the National Army as a conciliatory gesture prior to the third shir beeleed in Hargeysa.

Beside the war imperative and the legitimate need for an army to defend the popularly elected government from internal clan insurrection, the drafting of clan militias into the army was used by the government as an economic inducement to enlist the support of local clans. This tendency to seek to reward loyalty explains the high level of military and civilian government personnel in Somaliland.

After the end of the war, ‘Egaal’s administration was confronted with the problem of how to manage this large army. The administration generated enough revenue to pay the security forces and the inflated civil service without bilateral budget assistance until the end of 1998. On February 7, 1998, however, Saudi Arabia imposed a complete ban on livestock imports from the northeastern part of Africa, including Somaliland, because of the presence of Rift Valley fever in certain areas. This created an unexpected large budget deficit, eroding the ability of the government to pay the salaries of the security forces and public servants. This created a potential security threat and revived the 1992 spectre of a widespread breakdown in law and order by hungry clan militia, endangering the progress made in domestic stability and governance in Somaliland.

The livestock ban pushed the administration to appeal to the international community for financial assistance in the form of budgetary support, to cover the estimated revenue shortfall of $14.87 million (although a donor mission estimated the deficit to be in the range of $7-7.5 million).

The government appeal and donor response documents reveal important information about the burden the large security forces and the inflated public service have placed on the limited budget of the government: almost 95% of revenue is spent on administration (20-23%) and defence and security (72%). There is little going to the productive and infrastructure (3%) and social (3-5%) sectors. (The meagre resources going to these sectors are chiefly used to support the administrative departments of these sectors, with very little going directly to development.) With such a low resource base, it would be difficult for the administration to invest more towards development.

In the proposed emergency assistance document, the government acknowledged the absence of sufficient external or internal threat to warrant the high level of the security forces. About 8,000 of the security forces are considered a surplus awaiting demobilization and social integration. Of the 6,000 civil servants, 2,500 are also assessed as surplus staff.

It is too early to speculate whether the limited emergency assistance (around US$3.6 million) pledged by the SACB in the form of intensive labor projects will help Somaliland survive the threat of disintegration of its security forces. The livestock export ban was still in effect as of this writing (October 1998) and it is not certain when it will be lifted. Even if the livestock ban is lifted, the administration will need substantial assistance from the international community to demobilize the 8,000 surplus security forces and downsize the public sector. The emergency assistance package, however limited, offers a glimmer of hope to the current administration, for it may signify a change from the negligence of the past.

Somaliland’s checkered experience in peacekeeping and governance during the prolonged transition period bespeaks the disruptive influence SNM clan militias and the power struggle within the SNM political elite have had on political development, internal security and overall socio-economic reconstruction. The creation of a large army may overcome internal strife but it cannot guarantee domestic stability and an environment conducive to political rebuilding and a transition to a democratic system of governance.

To attain its present level of domestic stability and functioning institutions of government, Somaliland endured two devastating cycles of internal violence involving still-unresolved power struggles between the civilian and military wings of the SNM. Military officials with political aspirations still abound in Somaliland and constitute a threat to the current administration and its program of transition to parliamentary democracy. The influence of the ‘alan cas in Somaliland and of military leaders elsewhere in Somalia is a legacy of two decades of militarization that cannot be resolved by force. The ‘alan cas leaders fought for the independence of Somaliland and believe they have a vested interest in contributing to its development; they think they are being deliberately ignored by the current administration and want to be consulted in the process of rebuilding the country.

The third shir beeleed in Hargeysa finally achieved the long-anticipated transition from a broadly based interim system of governance anchored in the pervasive clan-based political culture to a constitutional system based on multiparty democracy and free and fair elections. The challenge facing ‘Egaal’s current administration is to prepare the ground for the practice of democracy as enshrined in the constitution adopted in the last congress (and awaiting public ratification), and in the meantime consolidate peace and expand centralized rule throughout Somaliland.

The constitution approved in the third shir beeleed of Somaliland enshrines principles that enhance the development of stable civil-military relations in Somaliland. A possible solution to Somaliland’s unresolved and disruptive power struggle is the introduction of a constitution clearly defining the institutional functions and mandates of security and civilian institutions, while at the same time adopting democratic rules governing access by the elite to high public office regardless of professional bias.

The following articles regulate the distribution of power and authority between the civilian and military elite:

Article 38

Freedom of Association

It is forbidden any organisation with aims and objectives that are deemed detrimental to the wider interest of the society, including covert and underground organisations, armed and with military structure, or any other organisation that violates the constitution regardless of its form.

Article 61

Joint Sessions of the Two Chambers of the Parliament

The two chambers of the parliament (council of elders and elected legislature), will hold joint sessions to deliberate on the following issues:

x. The decision and the declaration of war when the Republic of Somaliland is faced with a state of war.

Article 77

The Power and Obligation of the Council of Representatives

The decision by the executive to introduce emergency rule throughout the country or parts of the country should seek the approval of the two chambers of parliament.

Article 115

The Powers of the President

3. Nomination and change of high public officials of the government after consultation with the responsible Minister, and having considered the constitution and by laws.

Commanders of the armed forces and their deputies.

4. General commander.

Article 148

1) The armed force is responsible to defend and secure the integrity and independence of the country from external aggression, in addition, it will act in response to necessary emergency as circumstances demand, in accordance with the constitution.

2) The armed force must always abide by and ensure the execution of the constitution and by laws of the country.

3) The formation of the National Army is an internal matter limited to the different parts of the country.

4) The individual nominated to be the Minister of Defence must be a citizen and a civilian.

5) A by-law defining the structure of the National Army will be formulated.

Article 149

Police Force and Prison Corps

The police force is responsible for domestic security and stability and ensuring the execution of the constitution and laws of the country, their structure and functions will be defined in a by-law.

The prison corps are responsible for keeping and rehabilitation of the prisoners, their structure and functions will be defined in a by-law.

CONCLUSION

The first nine years of parliamentary democracy in Somalia after independence in 1960 were the most stable in the country’s history in terms of civil-military relations. The security forces of the new nation seemed to embrace a professional attitude and approach, with different organs of the security forces pursuing distinct functions. The military elite leading the national army, police and other security forces respected the supremacy of its civilian masters and political decision-making remained the prerogative of elected civilian political leaders. The constitution enshrined the supremacy of civilian politicians and relations with the public institutions of governance were conducted in accordance with the rather liberal constitution of the country.

The military elite managed the different branches of the security forces of the young nation independently and effectively. This kept intact the credibility of the security establishment and of distinguished military officials, in the face of civilian misrule and abuses of power. The law-and-order functions of the security forces provided domestic stability and prevented the misrule by the civilian leaders from degenerating into conflict. Venerated as the epitome of national aspirations, the armed forces were well prepared to save the country from imminent political disintegration.

Two decades of centralized socialist rule followed the parliamentary system of government. The junta militarized governance, relegated civilian officials to a subordinate status and repressed the evolution of democratic political culture in an effort to control and change every facet of Somali life. In the 1980s, the early progress achieved by the military regime such as the expansion of social services began to unravel through mismanagement and endemic corruption. The formidable army and other branches of the security forces were used in suppressing growing popular dissatisfaction with the dictatorial military regime. In the ensuing political struggle, the functions of the different branches of the armed forces became blurred as loyal forces were used against increasing clan-based insurrection in the 1980s.

Emerging political entities in Somalia have to deal with the legacy of militarization. The modest progress achieved in Somaliland with respect to keeping relative peace and resurrecting basic institutions of government has come at the cost of two rounds of fighting involving the long-standing power struggle between military and political factions of the SNM. Nevertheless, there seems to a shift in the balance of power to the civilian politicians in Somaliland, a change that reflects the widespread desire of the people for a return to democratic civilian rule. But the principle of civilian leadership in Somaliland will take some time to develop firm roots, because two decades of military rule institutionalized the place of military elites in high public office.

It is important that competition for control of the administration between civilian and military leaders should take place in a regulated setting, otherwise Somaliland will be caught in a vicious cycle of internal power struggles. Military officials ought to be discouraged of their tendency to seize power through undemocratic means. At the same time, it is unrealistic to preclude military leaders from a public career since many of them are able to contribute meaningfully to the reconstruction of Somaliland.

It is too early to predict if the Interim Charter and the Puntland administration created by the first shir beeleed in Garowe will deliver a peaceful transition to a democratic system of governance, consolidate peace, or facilitate socio-economic development in Northeast Somalia or Puntland. The realization of a peaceful transition will save Puntland from the kinds of internal power struggles that occurred in Somaliland in the transition period. Nevertheless, formidable obstacles stand in the way of a smooth transition, including unresolved disputes between the military elite and the civilian leaders as well as volatile relations with Somaliland over the question of Harti-controlled areas in Somaliland.